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WHAT IS PROPERTY? PROPERTY IS
THEFT:* THE LACK OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN
U.S. EMINENT DOMAIN LAW
JANET THOMPSON JACKSONt
INTRODUCTION
The individual right of property is not simply an economic
right .... Individual property rights are also about self-
expression, self-governance, belonging, and civic participation.
A proper theory of constitutional protection of property should
therefore be concerned about possible abuse of government power
when cities condemn land, especially residential land, to enable
projects whose benefits redound substantially to private entities.
Monetary compensation, even when it satisfies the constitutional
requirement of being "just," is not always enough to make the
dispossessed landowner whole.
1
This is not an article against eminent domain per se. In fact,
when used responsibly, the power of eminent domain can produce
economic and social benefits for a community and residents
within the community. When, however, a government abuses its
* The title What Is Property? Property Is Theft comes from Pierre-Joseph
Proudhon (1809-1865), who asked the question, "What is property?" and then
infamously answered, "Iilt is robbery" or as it is more commonly translated:
"Property is theft." See generally PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY?
10 (Univ. Va. Library 1996) (1840).
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power of eminent domain, the economic and social costs to the
affected individuals and neighborhoods, combined with the moral
costs, far outweigh the benefits. When that abuse occurs, the
government, and often the courts, have failed in their obligation
to create and maintain a just social system.
This Article contends that social justice is largely
absent in eminent domain law, particularly in the context of
blight removal2 and economic development condemnations.
Government takings too often result in an undue burden on poor
people and communities of color in a way that resembles
Discovery-era takings of land from American Indians. In the
periods of colonization and western expansion of the United
States, as well as in recent takings, the lack of social justice has
had a profound effect: the disproportionate burden and
exploitation of people who have the fewest resources-legally,
politically, or economically-with which to resist the intrusion of
eminent domain. Rooted in a historical framework of social
justice, this Article examines the pervasive injustice in the realm
of eminent domain. Specifically, the Article critiques the too
often unchecked power of governments3 to declare neighborhoods
"blighted," or merely in need of revitalization, so that
jurisdictions can hand the land over to private entities for
"better" uses. Such action divorces eminent domain from
principles of social justice in a way that is inconsistent with the
values upon which American society purports to function.
2 Blight removal that provides measurable benefits to residents in decaying
communities is not objectionable; however, the incentive to characterize areas in the
United States as "blighted" has not come from a desire to improve the community for
the benefit of the people living there or to improve their standard of living. See Stacy
L. Leeds, By Eminent Domain or Some Other Name: A Tribal Perspective on Taking
Land, 41 TuLSA L. REV. 51, 55 (2005).
1 Though more than forty states have passed some type of eminent domain
reform that limits the ability of local governments to take private property for blight
reform or economic development, many of the new laws fail to define blight or
economic development, and thus, do little to place stricter controls on these types of
condemnations. See generally CASTLE COALITION, 50 STATE REPORT CARD:
TRACKING EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM LEGISLATION SINCE KELO (2009), available at
http'//www.castlecoalition.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=2412&
Item=129.
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Socrates once pondered, "justice, if only we knew what it
was."4 When we add the modifier social the task becomes more
challenging. What do we mean by the term social justice, and
how does that concept fit within American jurisprudence? More
to the point, to what extent do we find social justice reflected in
American property jurisprudence and in the arena of eminent
domain? Lawyers, politicians, activists, theologians, and
everyday citizens use the term social justice to call for legal,
political, and social change. One would think that a phrase so
ubiquitous would have a common meaning, but such is not the
case. Still, most people claim to know justice when they see it.
But rather than some absolute meaning, judgments about that
ideal tend to reflect the image of the seeker looking in the mirror.
Moreover, notions of what should be done in the name of justice
tend to change as society changes. Despite such daunting
considerations, it is imperative that we examine the principle of
social justice in the context of U.S. eminent domain law so that
we can determine whether current eminent domain law upholds
or undermines our country's commitment to justice.
The first part of this Article examines private property rights
and the tension between individual and governmental interests.
The second part explores the ideals and evolution of justice and
social justice. This Section gives historical account of justice and
social justice to provide a framework for those principles as they
relate to eminent domain law. Part III looks at the introduction
of social justice into American jurisprudence and addresses two
ways in which social justice has been advanced in the United
States: through social movements and through legal reform. In
this Section, I give examples of how those vehicles have led to
legal protections for the most vulnerable in society and assert
that the same can be done for those unduly burdened by blight
removal and economic development condemnations. Part IV
discusses the development of case law in the area of eminent
domain. This Part discusses the government dispossession of
tribal lands, a seeming presage to the application of eminent
4 Plato, a student of Socrates, also questioned, "What is justice?" Plato, The
Republic (ca. 380 B.C.) (G.M.A. Grube trans., rev. C.D.D. Reeve) (Hackett Publishing
Co. 1992). In Greek, two words come closest to representing the modern concept of
justice: eson or isotes means "equality," and dikaiosune, the word used by Plato for
justice, means 'righteousness." See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, reprinted in WHAT IS
JUSTICE?: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS, at 21 (Robert C. Solomon &
Mark C. Murphy eds., 2d ed. 2000).
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domain today. It also covers the origins of eminent domain and
the intersection of social justice with the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause. Part V examines the development of urban
renewal and economic development policies that led to the
shaping of eminent domain law by legislatures and courts,
culminating in the Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo v. City of New
London.5 This Section concludes that legislatures and courts
have an obligation toward social justice in governmental takings
but that they have ignored this obligation at the great expense of
poor people and people of color. Part VI reviews the national
debate that has erupted since Kelo in the form of social
movements and legal reform. There, I suggest that while these
actions represent a significant effort to reverse the negative
impact of Kelo, they are not enough to bring justice to all
communities, including poor communities and communities of
color.
In conclusion, I posit that, while not all eminent domain is
bad, circumstances exist under which the use of eminent domain
is inherently unjust. These circumstances include the historical
and current use of blight as a pretext for the displacement
of entire communities of color and economic development
condemnations that transfer private property to private interests
for profit. Eminent domain within these frameworks violates
basic notions of justice and constitutes a betrayal of our nation's
sense of fairness. Until all citizens-regardless of race, income,
or any other distinction-can protect their communities from
unjust intrusions of eminent domain, the most vulnerable in our
society will continue to be exploited by more powerful interests in
the name of civic progress and economic development.
5 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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I. WHAT IS PROPERTY IN THE CONTEXT OF EMINENT
DOMAIN?
The right of property is the guardian of every other right, and to
deprive a people of this, is in fact to deprive them of their
liberty.6
"Every tenant of 602 West 132nd street has deep roots in the
community, and many households have multiple generations
living in the same home. One man, now in his nineties, has been
living in the same apartment since the 1950s."7 Most all of the
residents in the thirty-one unit, six-story apartment building-
seniors, "an assistant teacher, a few home health care
attendants, restaurant and fast food workers, a print shop
employee, a police officer, and a nurse, to name a few"-know
who lives in every apartment.8 The mostly African American,
Mexican, Dominican, Puerto Rican, Ecuadorian, and Honduran
families have lived there for over thirty years-some even were
born in the building. The most recent residents arrived over
twenty years ago.9
Apartment building 602 on West 132nd Street is located in a
West Harlem neighborhood known as Manhattanville, a
neighborhood in which Columbia University is planning a
seventeen-acre expansion for a "mixed-use academic center."10
Reportedly, Columbia will acquire and then demolish building
602 and neighboring properties after New York City uses its
eminent domain powers to obtain the land. Much of the
neighboring land is industrial, but more than 400 low-income
6 See JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON-LAW LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 174 n.31 (2003).
1 Coalition To Preserve Community, Columbia's Expansion Would Destroy
Hundreds of Homes; Tenants in These Properties Are United in Their Intent To
Stay, httpJ/www.stopcolumbia.orgtcontenttview/55/66 (last visited Apr. 5, 2010)
[hereinafter Coalitition To Preserve Community, Columbia's Expansion]. The
Coalition To Preserve Community describes itself as a grassroots organization
"dedicated to promoting the vitality and diversity of [its] neighborhoods and to
preserving the residential character of [its] community." Coalition To Preserve
Community, What We Stand For, httpJ/www.stopcolumbia.org/content/view/31/44/
(last visited Apr. 5, 2010) [Coalition To Preserce Community, What We Stand For].
8 Coalition To Preserve Community, Columbia's Expansion, supra note 7.
9 See id.
10 See Columbia University, Manhattanville in West Harlem, httpJ/neighbors.
columbia.edu/pages/manplanning/index.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).
20101
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
residents" are also in the zone of demolition. 2 Protestors argue
that the project will also alter neighboring communities,
which are "among the most vibrant and diverse low-income
neighborhoods in the world." 3
On the other hand, Columbia University characterizes the
expansion as an attractive academic urban environment that will
blend in with the surrounding community. 14  According to
Columbia, its "smart growth" plan will create thousands of new
jobs for area residents, preserve the culture and vitality of
Harlem, and also provide new research, teaching, and other
benefits to the university." Concerning the residents who will be
displaced by the expansion, Columbia has given the assurance
that it "has made a commitment to relocate residents of these
units to equal or better housing in the area."16
Is Columbia University's planned expansion an appropriate
use of eminent domain? Columbia states that it has sought to
negotiate purchases of property from affected property owners
and that eminent domain is being used only with property
owners who have refused to sell.' 7 Residents say that eminent
11 See Coalition To Preserve Community, Columbia's Expansion, supra note 7.
The Coalition To Preserve Community website reports that, of the 400 residents,
approximately 140 families will be displaced. Id. Since 2003, many of the residents
have been in the Tenant Interim Lease (TIL) program, which allows tenants the
chance to purchase their homes from the city at an affordable price and then operate
them as low-income cooperatives. Id. "[Tihe current average income for households
in the TIL program is under $10,000 per year...."Id.
12 See id. Columbia University's website on the project states the following:
There are 135 occupied residential units in the project area .... Residents
in the Tenant Interim Lease (TIL) program will retain their "sweat equity"
toward ownership and will have the opportunity to own their units sooner.
The University will provide these TIL residents replacement housing, and
it will ensure a net 10 percent increase in such affordable units. Columbia
will also provide moving and relocation assistance to interested residents.
Columbia University, Manhattanville in West Harlem, http://neighbors.columbia
.edu/pages/manplanning/index.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).
13 Coalition To Preserve Community, Columbia's Plan Would Cause Thousands
of Families Living Outside the Expansion Zone in Harlem and Washington Heights
To Be Displaced, http'//stopcolumbia.orgcontent/view/53/65/ (last visited Apr. 5,
2010).
14 Columbia University, Manhattanville in West Harlem, httpJ/neighbors
.columbia.edu/pages/manplanning/index.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).
15 Id.
16 Id.
'" See id. Columbia also states that it has not requested the use of eminent
domain with respect to occupied residential properties and that the only properties
at issue for eminent domain are commercial. See id.
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domain is not appropriate and even assert that Columbia
intentionally "blighted" the area by purchasing properties and
then neglecting them.'8  In addition, residents claim that
Columbia's negotiations with property owners did not amount to
arms length negotiations because owners of property felt
threatened and coerced into selling their property. 19
As to the residents in building 602 who will be displaced,
Columbia University certainly intends to assuage anger and fear
and, indeed, to provide comfort through its promise of "equal or
better housing." What Columbia's promise of relocation does not
recognize, however, is the overwhelming sentiment that one's
house is more than just a piece of property that can be taken and
then replaced. For most, a house is a home, filled with symbolic
meaning. A home represents a person's centering place in the
community and in the world. A home provides shelter and
security in both literal and figurative ways. For many, a home
also represents a sense of accomplishment. Researchers have
found that people all over the world feel a common connection to
their homes, whether those homes are huts or mansions.20
Similarly, a neighborhood represents more than simply the place
in which a home is located. A neighborhood provides resources
for survival,2 including people, places of worship, schools, small
businesses, and other organisms that create a community.22
Most people believe that they have a right to live wherever
their resources can take them. That is, most believe that they
have a right to own and exert control over their property, even
while acknowledging that private rights sometimes conflict with
the government's rights to exert some regulation over private
property. At the core of this tension is the question of whether
an individual's right to private property represents a
fundamental right. Though this remains a contentious issue of
18 See Corey Kilgannon & Stacey Stowe, State Officials Approve Expansion by
Columbia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at A40.
19 See Coalition To Preserve Community, Columbia's Expansion, supra note 7.
20 See Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Eminent Domain & African Americans: What
Is the Price of the Commons?, in 1 PERSPECTIVES ON EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE 1, 3
(2007), available at http'J/www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/Perspectives-
Fullilove.pdf.
21 Id. at 3-4.
2 Dr. Fullilove refers to a neighborhood as a "commons," meaning the "social,
political, cultural, and economic networks that [function] for both individual and
common good." Id. at 1-2.
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constitutional law, 3 compelling arguments exist that private
property rights constitute fundamental rights.24 As such, any
infringement on private property rights must be carefully
scrutinized, especially where vulnerable citizens are concerned-
such as the residents of West Harlem.
II. THE ORIGINS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE WESTERN
WORLD
Anum and Enlil named me
to promote the welfare of the people,
me, Hammurabi, the devout, god-fearing prince,
to cause justice to prevail in the land,
to destroy the wicked and the evil,
that the strong might not oppress the weak,
to rise like the sun over the black-headed (people),
and to light up the land.25
This Article focuses on the nexus of social justice and
American jurisprudence, specifically in the context of blight
removal and economic development condemnations exercised
under eminent domain law. The understanding of that
interconnection benefits from examining the meaning and
application of justice. An exhaustive treatment of the concept of
justice is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, this Article
will touch on key historical origins of justice and social justice in
western society26 in order to frame the place social justice holds
in eminent domain jurisprudence today.
Throughout most of the world, and certainly in the United
States, the principle of justice has undergirded the foundations of
social order and legal systems. After all, the concept of justice
has a long history in American jurisprudence and an even longer
history in western religions and philosophy. The word "justice"
See Bret Boyce, Property as a Natural Right and as a Conventional Right in
Constitutional Law, 29 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 201, 201 (2007).
24 See generally David A. Thomas, Is the Right to Private Property a
Fundamental or an Economic Right?, SM006 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUC. 33, 44 (2007).
2 See Prologue to the Laws of Hammurabi (T.J. Meek trans., ANET 164), quoted
in John J. Collins, INTRODUCTION TO THE HEBREW BIBLE 126 (2004). Hammurabi,
King of Babylon from 1792-1750 B.C.E., published the Code of Hammurabi to
promote the moral, political, and legal values of his government.
26 An expanded scope would also be needed to explore nonwestern
conceptualizations of justice.
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first arises in early religious codes, such as the Code of
Hammurabi, v the Covenant Code,28 and the Deuteronomic
Code.29 Scholars have concluded that in ancient times, the word
"justice" was associated with a wide range of meanings so that
even then, there existed a general lack of agreement as to its
scope.30 Hence, people have discussed and disagreed about the
meaning of justice for thousands of years. To add complexity,
justice has many facets and is perceived through a variety of
lenses, though each perspective carries the common theme of a
social or institutional responsibility.
A. Four Lenses of Social Justice: Religious, Philosophical,
Mythological, and Legal
When approached through a religious lens, justice often
includes an action as well as an outcome. In other words, justice
in faith language, requires followers to live out the meaning of
justice, not merely to expect just results. For example,
Hammurabi charged the people "to cause justice to prevail in the
land... that the strong might not oppress the weak."31 In the
Hebrew Bible, prophets beckon the people "to do justice"32 and to
"let justice roll down like waters."3 Moreover, particular care is
taken of those on the margins of society: "When you gather the
grapes of your vineyard, do not glean what is left; it shall be for
the alien, the orphan, and the widow. Remember that you were a
slave in the land of Egypt; therefore I am commanding you to do
this."34 In the New Testament, Jesus Christ affirms the call to
protect the most vulnerable as he says:
For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was
thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger
27 See Hammurabi supra note 25.
28 See, e.g., Exodus 23:2, 23:6 (Revised Standard); Amos 5:24 (Revised Standard).
29 See, e.g., Deuteronomy 16:18, 24:17 (Revised Standard).
30 See THOMAS L. LECLERC, YAHWEH IS EXALTED IN JUSTICE: SOLIDARITY AND
CONFLICT IN IsAIAH 7 (2001). Similar to the Greek language, the Hebrew words
migpdt and siddqd (righteousness) translate (depending on context) to the English
word "justice." At least nine other Hebrew words or terms have been associated with
the word "justice." Those words translate in English to steadfastness, faithfulness,
kindness, sufficiency/peace, statute, commandmentlordinance, instruction/law,
correction/warning, and completeness.
31 See Hammurabi supra note 25.
32 Micah 6:8 (New American Standard).
3 Amos 5:24 (New American Standard).
I4 Deuteronomy 24:21-22 (New Revised Standard).
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and you invited me in, I needed clothes and you clothed me, I
was sick and you looked after me, I was in prison and you came
to visit me. Then the righteous will answer him, 'Lord, when
did we see you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you
something to drink? When did we see you a stranger and invite
you in, or needing clothes and clothe you? When did we see you
sick or in prison and go to visit you?' [Jesus] will reply, 'I tell
you the truth, whatever you did for one of the least of these
brothers of mine, you did for me.'35
Islamic law holds a worldview of justice, which includes as a
main principle, to "construct a world of justice and laws" 36 and, as
instructed by the Qur'an, followers must pursue justice by
treating everyone "justly, generously and with kindness" and
when judging, "judge with justice."37 Thus, the justice of religion
involves a kinship, a shared responsibility toward others in a
community. Both individuals in society and institutions share
the responsibility of protecting vulnerable members of society
and ensuring a just society. How would such an ethic of shared
responsibility inform our approach to eminent domain today?
What would these standards of social justice borne out of
antiquity require of our modern day legislatures and courts as
they consider the plight of the most vulnerable in the face of
eminent domain actions?
From a philosophical lens, justice is the sine qua non of
existence. According to Plato, justice unites the individual with
society-without justice neither can exist and with justice, they
can embrace.38  To extend Plato's portrayal, injustice
fractures the individual from society. American Indians
experienced this type of fracturing when "discoverers" took
tribal lands, just as many present-day low-income residents
experience fracturing from their communities as a result of
blight removal and economic development condemnations.
Matthew 25:35-40 (New International).
36 Liaquat All Khan, An Islamic View of the Battlefield, 7 BARRY L. REV. 21, 32
(2006).
37 Mohammed Abu-Nimer, A Framework for Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in
Islam, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 217, 233, 239 (2000-01) (quoting THE MEANING OF THE
HOLY QUR'AN 16:90, 4:58 ('Abdullah Yusuf 'Ali trans., Amana Publications, New rev.
10th ed. 2001)).
8 See Plato, supra note 4.
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Plato's student Aristotle, in articulating the complexity of
the concept, separated justice into the categories of "lawful"
justice39 and "fair and equal" justice.4" Aristotle then explained
the "fair and equal" concept in the dual frameworks of
distributive and rectificatory justice.41 As defined by Aristotle,
distributive justice relates to what people deserve and the notion
of equality but more in terms of proportion to merit than equal
distribution.42 Philosopher and theologian Paul Tillich criticized
Aristotle's concept of distributive justice. Tillich feared that,
according to Aristotle's concept, a person's merit would be
determined by their social status, which itself would be a
combination of a person's historical destiny and the degree to
which they actualized their individual potential.43 Whereas
Aristotle's distributive justice "presupposes a hierarchy of
standing and claims for a just distribution," Tillich asserts that
the word justice itself connotes equality.' Tillich asks, "[h] ow is
the hierarchical element in proportional justice related to the
equalitarian element in it?"4 5 Tillich's concern is that social
status unfairly privileges some people's claims over others. One
could apply Tillich's criticism to eminent domain abuse, where
the social status and political connections of private developers
unfairly privileges that group over less powerful, low-income
residents.
Another philosophical theory that has direct relevance to the
current state of eminent domain is utilitarianism. As advocated
by John Stuart Mill, utilitarianism asserts that the moral worth
of an action is determined by what produces the greatest
happiness for the greatest number of people.46 Rationalizing
9 Rather than obedience to the laws, "lawful" justice more closely translates to
"righteousness." See Introduction to ARISTOTLE, THE VARIOUS TYPES OF JUSTICE (ca.
322 B.C.), reprinted in WHAT IS JUSTICE?: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS,
supra note 4, at 35.
40 Id. at 39-40.
41 Id. at 39-42. Rectificatory justice includes voluntary and involuntary
transactions-such as buying, selling, or lending (voluntary) and insult, theft, or
assassination (involuntary)-and contemplates equality instead of proportion. Id. at
40-41.
Id. at 39-40.
4 See PAUL TILLICH, LOVE, POWER, AND JUSTICE: ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSES AND
ETHICAL APPLICATIONS 9 (1954).
"Id. at 10.
4Id.
46 See JOHN STUART MILL, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND UTILITY (1861), reprinted in
WHAT IS JUSTICE?: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS, supra note 4, at 166.
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principles of justice from a utilitarian perspective, utilitarianism
might seek to maximize utility throughout society by allocating
the benefits and burdens of society based on what produces the
most pleasure for the greatest number of people. When property
is the resource being allocated, it too must serve a utilitarian
purpose. Mill emphasized that private property serves a "means
to an end," and that "[firom the utilitarian point of view, the
right of private property is founded solely on the motives it
affords to the increase of public wealth."47
Mill's view represents a present-day rationale for eminent
domain abuses in the form of economic development and blight
removal condemnations. In fact, since Discovery-era takings,
governments have justified property appropriations on the basis
of someone else's ability to make (what is perceived to be) a
better or more profitable use of it. Private developers and local
governments have rationalized the displacement of thousands of
poor residents and people of color by pointing to the increased
value of the neighborhood. The unfortunate consequence may be
played out in West Harlem, where hundreds of residents who
have lived in the community for decades will be displaced
because the judgment was made that Columbia University's
expansion plan will, in the aggregate, produce the greatest
benefit.
In his influential work, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls
challenges Mill's utilitarian theory and places justice at the core
of philosophical moral theory." In his work, Rawls introduces
his theory of "justice as fairness," which centers on "the
usual sense of justice in which it is essentially the elimination of
arbitrary distinctions and the establishment, within the
structure of a practice, of a proper balance between competing
claims. "4 In his subsequent work Justice as Fairness: Political
not Metaphysical, Rawls clarifies that "justice as fairness"0 is a
47 Todd B. Adams, Is There a Legal Future for Sustainable Development in
Global Warming? Justice, Economics, and Protecting the Environment, 16 GEO. INVTL
ENVTL. L. REV. 77, 114 (2003).
4' See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20 (rev. ed. 1999) ("My aim is to work
out a theory of justice that represents an alternative to utilitarian thought.. ").
49 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS (1958), reprinted in JOHN RAWLS:
COLLECTED PAPERS, at 47-48 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
o Rawls describes "justice as fairness" as an elaboration of the doctrine of the
social contract. See JOHN RAWLS, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: SOME ADDENDA (1968),
reprinted in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 49, at 173.
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"political conception of justice," meaning that it applies not only
to individuals in society, but also to society's institutions and how
those institutions interlock into a unified cooperative social
system.51
Thus, the utilitarian theory of seeking the highest pleasure
violates Rawls's basic notion of the proper balancing of competing
claims. Rawls asserts that "[tihe principle of utility subordinates
persons to the common good" in a way that contradicts justice as
fairness.52 In Rawls's view, justice cannot be achieved through a
system that allows, "at least in theory, that the greater gains of
some... may offset the losses of others less fortunate." 3 In that
way, Rawls advances a view of social justice that would not allow
individuals or institutions to impose upon the vulnerable in
society the lower prospects of displacement from home and
community for the sake of promoting the profit of others.54
Mythology is another lens through which we see the
centrality of justice in society. The principle of justice had
"cosmic validity" for Roman Stoics. 55  Much of this cosmic
significance is also reflected in Greek and Roman legends.56 The
Greek and Roman goddesses Dike and Justitia, respectively,
personified human and moral justice. When their mission of
keeping mortals righteous proved impossible because of the
61 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: POLITICAL NOT METAPHYSICAL (1985),
reprinted in WHAT IS JUSTICE?: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS, supra note
4, at 340. Rawls's political conception of justice as fairness presupposes two
principles that direct how institutions realize the standards of liberty and equality:
(1) each person must have "an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic
rights and liberties," which is compatible for all and (2) social and economic
inequalities must "[attach] to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity; and... they must be to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged members of society." Rawls concludes that "[tihe two principles together,
when the first is given priority over the second, regulate the basic institutions which
realize these values." Id. at 341.
52 JOHN RAWLS, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: SOME ADDENDA (1968), reprinted in
JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 49, at 168.
5 Id.
-' See id. at 168-69.
6 See TILLICH, supra note 43, at 55. Tillich also claims that "Ulustice is based on
a cosmic hierarchy." Id. at 59.
-6 Heraclitus, a Greek philosopher of the late sixth century B.C.E., related the
movement of the cosmos with justice. See id. at 55.
57 See Morris B. Hoffman, The Myth of Factual Innocence, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
663, 678-79 (2007).
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intractable corruption of humans, they fled to the cosmos. The
Western world continues to anthropomorphize them through
Lady Justice, the iconic symbol of the legal system.
The idea of a cosmos-justice connection resonated with
Thomas Sowell, who coined the phrase "cosmic justice."8
According to Sowell, cosmic justice seeks to correct the random
and unmerited misfortunes that arise from the cosmos. 59  In
distinguishing traditional justice from cosmic justice, Sowell
describes traditional justice as an impartial process through
which justice may be accomplished regardless of the outcome. 0
This definition certainly finds resonance in our legal system,
where most outcomes are deemed fair and just if they arise from
a fair and impartial process. On the other hand, cosmic justice
requires a higher standard. "Cosmic justice is not about the
rules of the game."61 Rather, cosmic justice requires a balance of
outcomes. Similar to a contract remedy, it requires that the
parties end up in the position they would have held but for their
cosmic misfortune.2 As Sowell puts it, "Much of the quest for
cosmic justice involves racial, regional, religious, or other
categories of people who are to be restored to where they would
be but for various disadvantages they suffer from various
sources."63 Inequalities that exist as a result of circumstance
carry weight that tips the balance in favor of those so
disadvantaged.'
' See generally THOMAS SOWELL, THE QUEST FOR COSMIC JUSTICE (1999).
Sowell acknowledges the challenge in defining social justice, saying,
One of the few subjects on which we all seem to agree is the need for
justice. But our agreement is only seeming because we mean such different
things by the same word. Whatever moral principle each of us believes
in ... we are only talking in a circle when we say that we advocate justice,
unless we specify just what conception of justice we have in mind. This is
especially so today, when so many advocate what they call "social justice"---
often with great passion, but with no definition.
Id. at3.
69 Id. at 5.
60 See id. at 9.
61 See id. at 12.
62 Id.
I Id. at 15.
6 Sowell notes that cosmic justice enters the legal realm in some instances, such
as in American criminal trials in which life circumstances may be considered before
sentencing a murderer-even if such circumstances had no direct bearing on the
crime. See id. at 10. Sowell acknowledges that the job of unpacking all of the
considerations connected to cosmic injustice is "staggering and superhuman" as
"[tihere is no 'standard' history that everyone has or would have had 'but for'
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How, then would cosmic justice treat those who have been
exploited by laws that allow governments to take private land
and give it to others to use in a way that is deemed more
productive? Similar to Rawls's justice as fairness, it seems that
cosmic justice would require a balancing of competing interests
and the elimination of arbitrary distinctions. In eminent domain
law, cosmic justice would not only mean an end to using "blight"
as a pretext to exploit the poor and people of color, it would also
mean implementing policies to restore communities in a way that
would allow low-income residents to stay and enjoy the benefits
of such improvements.
The legal lens of justice emerged from a blend of the
religious, philosophical, and even mythological lenses-though
these antecedents may not always find harmony with each other.
Ultimately, "rules" and "laws" come from the codification of
values concerned with fair dealing. The preamble to the U.S.
Constitution states that, "We the People of the United States, in
Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote
the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity."65 The inscription over the Supreme
Court building assures "Equal Justice Under Laws." Portrayals
of Lady Justice most often depict a blindfolded woman with
measuring scales in one hand and a sword in the other.
It seems from the Constitution's preamble that the framers
concerned themselves not only with establishing "[t]he fair and
proper administration of laws," as stated in one definition of
justice,66 but also with the broader, even paternalistic goal of
establishing some sort of harmony or unity among citizens.
Of course, at that time, the range of citizens with whom the
framers concerned themselves consisted of a narrowly defined,
homogeneous group of white male landowners. Nevertheless, the
language suggests a desire to incorporate a core value into our
legal and social structure. The Supreme Court inscription sends
a similar message: that the Court will rule without favor to
peculiar circumstances of particular groups, whose circumstances can be 'corrected'
to conform to some norm." Id. at 13, 15. While prejudicial decision making may
account for many inequalities, other inequalities exist simply because some people
have more or less than others through no design of their own.
m U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (8th ed. 2004).
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identity or status. Lady Justice holds comparable significance.
Her blindfold symbolizes justice meted out impartially; the scales
represent the careful balancing of the strengths and weaknesses
of each position; and the sword symbolizes the power of Reason
and Justice. Yet, despite this fundamental and inspiring ideal
that permeates all aspects of society, justice too often has
unequal application in the law. This disparity emerges in
eminent domain law, where both process and outcome yield
injustice. That reason, among others, makes the inquiry of social
justice and its relation to eminent domain law all the more
essential.
B. Contemporary Social Justice
Justice is a social virtue-it tells us how to order our,
relationships, what we must rightly do for one another-and so
our hope must be that we can all agree about what justice
demands of us, that everyone can feel that his or her legitimate
claims have been met. A successful theory would persuade
people to regulate their intuitive sense of justice by its principles
and allow this hope to be realized.6"
As illustrated through ancient texts, the concept of justice as
it relates to society is not new. Justice has always had a social
component. David Miller reminds us that "justice is a social
virtue." 9 Sowell posits that "All justice is inherently social" and
that the primary feature that distinguishes social justice is the
reaction to the inequities of income and wealth.7 ° While a bit
myopic, Sowell's view finds resonance at a most basic level. That
is, the reaction connected with social justice often comes from
collective action designed to force change in a certain part of
society. As citizens started attributing the responsibility of
justice to institutions, the contemporary meaning of social justice
surfaced.
67 See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727,
1727 (1987).
DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 21-22 (1999).
6 See id. at 21.
70 SOWELL, supra note 58, at 3.
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In the early part of the nineteenth century, justice qualified
mostly as an individual virtue, not a corporate one.7 The concept
of justice primarily belonged in "an established framework of
property rights which might.., include property in other human
beings"7 2 and basically consisted of "not cheating, stealing or
breaking contracts."73 Around the 1840s, the modern concept of
social justice emerged with the industrialization of France and
Britain.74 "The potentially revolutionary idea underlying the
concept of social justice was that the justice of a society's
institutions could be challenged not merely at the margins but at
the core."7' Thus, social justice encompassed the treatment of all
types of injustices, including those associated with the practices
of the power structures and institutions of society. By the early
twentieth century, the concept of social justice had become a
part of the standard discourse among social theorists, who
championed the idea that social and economic institutions should
be subject to public critique.76 The dichotomy between individual
behavior and corporate behavior was highlighted by the
American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr in his classic text Moral
Man and Immoral Society.77 Written in the aftermath of the
horrors of World War I, Niebuhr challenged the Western world's
self-understanding of justice as being not just an individual
virtue, but also an institutional one.78
The theory of social justice that developed during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has persisted, though
many now view social justice as synonymous with, or merely an
expanded version of, distributive justice.79  Contemporary
definitions of distributive justice seem to focus solely on things,
as in "the fair distribution of resources among members of
society," even where "differences in treatment are justifiable on
grounds relevant to the distinction."80 Others have stated that
71 See BRIAN BARRY, WHY SOCIAL JUSTICE MATTERS 4 (2005).
72 Id.
73 Id.
71 Id. at 5.
75 Id.
76 See MILLER, supra note 68, at 4.
77 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN & IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ETHICS
AND POLITICS (1932).
78 See id.
79 See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 68, at 2.
80 Jeffrey Gaba, Taking "Justice and Fairness" Seriously: Distributive Justice
and the Takings Clause, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 569, 576-77 (2007).
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equating social justice with distribution suggests a concern "with
the ways in which a range of social institutions and practices
together influence the shares of resources available to different
people.""1
The problem with equating social justice with the
contemporary meaning of distributive justice is that it limits the
power of social justice. And, to echo Tillich's concern, distributive
or proportional justice has a hierarchical quality that privileges
some over others because of status. Thus, distributive justice
overemphasizes the concern with resources and underemphasizes
the concern with the innate right of every person to be treated
with respect and dignity. Distribution of resources does
represent a partial definition of social justice, but it does not fully
encompass the broad concept. Social justice refers to more than
material things. Social justice also demands equal opportunity,
the redress of past wrongs, the protection of the oppressed and
disenfranchised, and basic self-determination. Social justice
connotes action, just as traditional justice has since ancient
times. Social justice means that, on individual and institutional
levels, people are treated fairly-in a "just" way-in a way that
does not differentiate on the basis of class, race, ethnicity, or
neighborhood.
III. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
Q: Don't you think [the colonies] would submit to the stamp-act,
if it was modified, the obnoxious parts taken out, and the duties
reduced to some particulars, of small moment?
A: No, they will never submit to it.. . 2
One could argue that the United States was created in good
measure out of a drive for social justice. Many of the early
immigrants made the perilous voyage to the New World because
they were being persecuted in their European homelands on the
basis of their religious or political beliefs. Once the colonies were
established, the first widespread challenge to English rule was
8' MILLER, supra note 68, at 11.
82 Unofficial Transcript of Benjamin Franklin's Testimony Before Parliament
(Feb. 13, 1766), in EYEWITNESS TO AMERICA: 500 YEARS OF AMERICA IN THE WORDS
OF THOSE WHO SAW IT HAPPEN 63 (David Colbert ed., 1997).
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triggered by Parliament's imposition of the Stamp Act of 1765.3
This revenue measure required that stamps be attached to all
printed and legal documents used in the colonies-including
leases, licenses, deeds, and even newspapers and pamphlets.'
Protests swept across the colonies and ultimately led Parliament
to repeal the act in March 1766.5 While this controversy was
resolved, it marked the beginning of a social justice movement
that culminated in the American Revolution. 6
Some jurists today view social justice as a central value in
American jurisprudence. Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit described the law as a
means to an end-a means to promote values that would allow
all people to live in a just society. In his view, social justice is
an appropriate goal of judicial decision making and, further,
constitutes a "substantive legal principle that pervades all
aspects of the law."8 8 He argues that while strict constructionists
view the U.S. Constitution merely as a technical document that
apportions responsibilities among governmental branches, a
more accurate vision of the document includes an inherent
commitment to social justice. 9 Judge Reinhardt recalls that the
drafters of the Constitution referred to it as an "experiment" in
government and that it contained "unjust compromises," such as
the slave trade and the provision that legally-though not
morally-reduced blacks to three-fifths of a man.9" He also
chronicles Justice William Brennan's acknowledgment of the
role of social justice as a core value in American jurisprudence:
"The Constitution embodies the aspiration to social justice,
brotherhood and human dignity that brought this nation into
being."91 In keeping with social justice as a fundamental core
83 See BENJAMIN GINSBERG & THEODORE J. LOWI, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT:
FREEDOM AND POWER 16 (2d ed. 1992).
84 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON ET AL., 1 THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
145 (6th ed. 1969).
85 Id. at 145-47.
86 See GINSBERG & LOWI, supra note 83, at 16.
87 See Hon. Stephen Reinhardt, The Role of Social Justice in Judging Cases,
1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 18, 20 (2003).
88 Id. at 20.
9 See id. at 20-21.
90 See id.
Id. at 22 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United
States: Contemporary Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 23 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990)).
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element of American democracy, Reinhardt argues that the
rights of the minority are as central to the Constitution as the
rights of the majority.92 This view conflicts with the application
of U.S. eminent domain laws, which typically favor dominant
social groupings.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor agreed with the centrality of
minority rights to the Constitution in her powerful dissent in
Kelo v. City of New London,93 the infamous case in which the U.S.
Supreme Court endorsed a local governmental transfer of private
property to a private entity for economic development. In her
dissent, Justice O'Connor expressed her disquiet over the
resulting likelihood that local authorities could take any property
for the gain of another private party. But her concern went
beyond process to the probable outcome-that the beneficiaries
would be those "with disproportionate influence and power in the
political process, including large corporations and development
firms.... [[Tihe victims would be] those with fewer
resources .... The Founders," she asserted, "cannot have
intended this perverse result."9a Justice Thomas addressed the
impact on those on the margins of society even more directly by
predicting that the results of the Kelo decision "promise to be
harmful."9 Recognizing the intangible value of a home, Justice
Thomas acknowledged that "no compensation is possible for the
subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced and
the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes."96
Justice Thomas warned that extending the concept of public use
to include "any economically beneficial goal guarantees that
these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities.
Those communities are not only systematically less likely to put
their lands to the highest and best social use, but are also the
least politically powerful."97
' See id. at 22.
93 545 U.S. 469 (2005). The Kelo case will be discussed in more detail infra Part
V.
Id. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
96 Id.
97 Id.
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A. Social Movements for Social Justice
Social movements both create pressure to force governments to
change and catalyze the changes in dialogue necessary for social
internalization of new norms. Over time, these changes can be
reflected in new law or policy or in changes in the interpretation
of existing legal and constitutional standards. 98
Often, more than one path will lead to the desired
destination of protecting the rights of the most vulnerable. In
American society, two distinct paths have emerged in achieving
social justice: social movements and legal reform. The two paths
are not mutually exclusive; in fact, some nexus usually exists.
Social movements "disrupt" established paradigms, refocus
conventional perspectives, and ultimately help to create
new norms.99  Often, the collective action inherent in social
movements challenges existing political, social, or legal practices
that unjustly burden marginalized groups. For that reason,
social movements play an important role in achieving social
justice. That is true even if social movements do not lead to legal
reform, but very often social movements do foster legal reform:
That is because movements disrupt and help reformulate the
social order on which the law and the courts ultimately depend.
Even without the formal authority to make law, social
movements have the power to change the meaning of law and to
alter the normative climate in which laws are interpreted and
understood.100
Thus, it is helpful to look at some examples of how
social movements and legal reform have transformed the legal
and political climate and led to greater social justice. The
civil rights and environmental justice movements illustrate
social movements in the interest of African Americans and low-
income people who experienced institutionalized oppression and
exploitation. Residential housing reform of the 1970s illustrates
legal reform fueled by injustices committed on the basis of race
and class. All of the examples demonstrate how governments
9 Cynthia Soohoo & Suzanne Stolz, Bringing Theories of Human Rights Change
Home, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 477 (2008).
9 See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social
Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 946 (2006).
100 Id. at 949.
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and courts can be forced to change and how, as stated by
Professors Soohoo and Stolz, new laws, policies, or constitutional
interpretations emerge, which reflect those changes. 01
1. The Civil Rights Movement
The most impactful social movement in the United States in
the past fifty years has been the civil rights movement. Not only
did that movement challenge the legitimacy of laws that allowed
for institutionalized racial discrimination, it also opened the
door ultimately for the first African American President of the
United States. Remarkably, the civil rights movement's early
progression was juxtaposed against the Supreme Court's
contemporaneous 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker,0 2 a case
which created a new paradigm in eminent domain legal theory.
As discussed later in this Article, the Supreme Court endorsed
blight removal condemnations in Berman, thereby paving the
way for economic development condemnations-both of which
disproportionately impact poor people and people of color,
making eminent domain a contemporary civil rights issue. 0 3
Some historians chart 1953 as the start of the civil rights
movement-that is, when Blacks succeeded in a mass boycott
against the segregated bus system in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.0 4
The Baton Rouge boycott inspired other boycotts, including the
famous Montgomery bus boycott, 10 5 and led to "a decade of
disruption."0 6  In the period between 1953 and 1960, the
foundation of the civil rights movement was built, thus providing
the structure for the sit-ins, marches, and other mass action that
followed."17
The civil rights movement will stand among the most
transformational events in United States history. Millions of
people in the South and other parts of the country sacrificed their
property, their freedom, and even their lives in order to
101 See Soohoo & Stolz, supra note 98, at 477-79.
102 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
I" See infra Part V.
'04 See ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIviL RIGHTS MOvEMENT: BLACK
COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE ix (1984).
100 The lesser-reported Baton Rouge boycott served as a model and motivation
for the famous Montgomery bus boycott of 1955, as well as the bus boycotts in
Tallahassee and Birmingham in 1955 and 1956. Id. at 40.
10 Id. at 195.
"I See id. at 194.
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dismantle unjust laws and practices. Even before the movement
resulted in legal reform under the auspices of landmark cases
and legislation such as Brown v. Board of Education,105 the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,109 the Voting Rights Act of 1965,110 and the
Fair Housing Act of 1968,"' it turned the American social
structure on its head. Mass protests and boycotts highlighted the
symbols of oppression for all of America and the world to see and
demanded reform. After the Civil Rights, Voting, and Fair
Housing Acts were passed, Blacks realized personal freedoms
that previously had been reserved for Whites only. Cities could
no longer legally keep residential housing, schools, parks, and
other public facilities off limits to Blacks.
The civil rights movement also resulted in a change in the
political landscape. Before the Civil Rights" 2 and Voting Rights
Acts, Blacks remained politically disenfranchised, and less than
one hundred Blacks held elective office in states targeted by the
Voting Rights Act. 113 By 1989, the number of elected officials in
these states had increased to 3,265."1 Within months of
Congress passing the Voting Rights Act, a significant number of
new Black voters had been registered; between 1964 and 1988,
African American voter registration in the Deep South had
increased from twenty-two percent to sixty-five percent." 5 By
1982, 5,160 African Americans held elected office and in 1984,
Birmingham and Atlanta had African American mayors. 16 By
108 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
'0 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243.
110 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (2004)).
"I Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968).
112 In response to the failure of the Civil Rights Act to protect minority votes,
President Lyndon B. Johnson instructed the Attorney General to "'write the god-
damnedest, toughest voting rights act that you can devise.'" R. Tim Hay, Comment,
Blind Salamanders, Minority Representation, and the Edwards Aquifer: Reconciling
Use-Based Management of Natural Resources with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 25
ST. MARY'S L.J. 1449, 1471-72 (1994) (quoting HOWARD BALL ET AL., COMPROMISED
COMPLIANCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT 44 (1982)).
Johnson's directive "produced the Voting Rights Act of 1965-arguably the most
influential piece of civil rights legislation since Reconstruction." Id. at 1472.
113 See James B. Zouras, Note, Shaw v. Reno: A Color-Blind Court in a Race-
Conscious Society, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 917, 928 (1995).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 928 & n.85 (citing Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief
History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN
PERSPECTIVE 7,43 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, eds., 1992)).
116 MORRIS, supra note 104, at 287.
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1990, "thirty-nine of the 535 United States congressmen were
African American or Latino," and that number increased to fifty-
nine by 1992.117
Social movements tend to resist containment and the civil
rights movement was no different. Other excluded groups, such
as American Indians, women, and farm workers, used the civil
rights movement as an example and organized within their own
communities.118 Groups outside of the United States were even
influenced by the movement, as demonstrated by the anti-
apartheid activists in South Africa1 19 and the antinuclear
movement in Europe. 120  In more recent years, activists have
drawn upon the legacy of the civil rights movement to push for
legislation against hate crimes, to advance equal rights for the
gay, lesbian, and transgendered persons, and to reform
environmental laws.
2. The Environmental Justice Movement
Issues in environmental law have striking parallels to issues
in blight removal and economic development condemnations. As
in eminent domain cases, poor people and people of color "bear
the brunt of environmental hazards."121  Within fourteen
impoverished and pesticide-laden miles in California, nineteen
children were diagnosed with cancer within a five-year period. 122
In a small African American town surrounded by chemical plants
and oil refineries in Louisiana's "Cancer Alley," residents suffer
from an unusually high number of cancers and other health
117 Zouras, supra note 113, at 928.
118 See MORRIS, supra note 104, at 288.
" See Robert J. Cottrol, Brown and the Contemporary Brazilian Struggle
Against Racial Inequality: Some Preliminary Comparative Thoughts, 66 U. Pir. L.
REV. 113, 116 (2005) ("[Tlhe struggles for human dignity in other societies.., were
fed and continue to be fed by the example of the Civil Rights movement in the
United States. The movement against apartheid in South Africa drew inspiration
from the fight against Jim Crow in the United States. The movement for equal
rights for Catholics in Northern Ireland saw parallels with the Afro-American fight
against American segregation.").
120 See MORRIS, supra note 104, at 288.
12' Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The
Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 640-41 (1992).
122 Id. at 621.
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ailments. Poor Indian reservations across the country are
targeted as potential sites for toxic waste incinerators, garbage
dumps, and radioactive waste disposal sites. 123
A recent study that uses 2000 census data'24 found that
people of color reside in fifty-six percent of the neighborhoods
within less than two miles of commercial hazardous waste
facilities (host neighborhoods); racial disparities exist in nine out
of ten Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") hazardous
waste sites; in forty of the forty-four states with hazardous waste
facilities, people of color make up the majority of residents in
host neighborhoods; and, in 2007, more people of color resided in
areas with commercial hazardous sites than in 1987.125 In light
of the persistent racial injustices concerning hazardous waste
sites, sociologist Robert Bullard noted at a recent Earth Day
celebration,
Let us all celebrate Earth Day 2007, but let's not forget that
there is still much work to be done to ensure that the
environment of all Americans is protected-without regard to
race, ethnicity, income, or the ability of individuals to hire
lawyers, technical experts, and "vote with their feet" to escape
unhealthy environments. Some communities have the wrong
complexion for protection.126
The environmental movement started as a conservation
movement in the 1970s with an initial focus on species
preservation and wilderness protection issues. 27
Environmentalists knew of problems in urban communities of
color but intentionally chose to focus attention elsewhere. In a
12 Id. at 622.
124 The study Toxic Wastes and Race at Twenty: 1987-2007: Grassroots Struggles
To Dismantle Environmental Racism in the United States, was led by environmental
justice scholars from Clark Atlanta University, the University of Michigan, the
University of Montana, and Dillard University, and it was commissioned by
the United Church of Christ (UCC"). See ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL., Toxic
WASTES AND RACE AT TWENTY: 1987-2007: GRASSROOTS STRUGGLES To DISMANTLE
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES i (2007), available at
httpJ/www.ejrc.cau.eduIVWART-light.pdf.
125 The study found that race outweighs poverty as the most significant indicator
for commercial hazardous waste facility locations. Id. at x.
126 Robert D. Bullard, People of Color More Concentrated near Hazardous
Waste Facilities than Twenty Years Ago, DISSIDENT VOICE, Apr. 9, 2007,
httpJ/www.dissidentvoice.orgAprO7/BullardO9.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
121 See Tseming Yang, Melding Civil Rights and Environmentalism: Finding
Environmental Justice's Place in Environmental Regulation, 26 HARV. ENvTL. L.
REV. 1, 4-5 (2002).
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1971 survey to national members, the Sierra Club asked, "Should
the Club concern itself with the conservation problems of such
special groups as the urban poor and ethnic minorities?" 2, The
majority of the membership voted against such involvement, with
fifty-eight percent either strongly or somewhat opposed to the
idea.12 9 Then, in 1982, the residents of Warren County, North
Carolina, decided to wage a protest against their governor's
decision to bury 60,000 tons of highly toxic polychlorinated
biphenyls ("PCB") in the community of Afton, located in Warren
County. 130 The residents contacted national civil rights leaders,
church leaders, and environmental leaders, who joined together
in protesting the landfill.' 3 ' And, there in Warren County, the
environmental justice movement was born.
In 1982, Warren County was the poorest county in the state
of North Carolina, with a population that was sixty-four percent
African American. Eighty-four percent of the county's African
American population was located in Afton. North Carolina
officials justified their selection of Warren County to house the
highly hazardous chemical landfill by stating that the county
provided a secure site for the toxins. Closer examination,
however, revealed that a nearby water table made Warren
County an inappropriate site. Despite unprecedented protests by
residents, members of Congress, civil rights leaders, church
leaders, and environmental activists and over 500 arrests, North
Carolina placed the landfill in Afton, Warren County. 32
The publicity of the Warren County landfill galvanized
action within various sectors, including the religious community.
Notably, in 1987, the United Church of Christ commissioned a
report which found that "[c]ommunities with the greatest
number of commercial hazardous waste facilities had the highest
composition of racial and ethnic residents."33 The study further
128 See Cole, supra note 121, at 620 n.1.
129 Id.
130 See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Racism PCB Landfill Finally
Remedied but No Reparations for Residents (Jan. 12, 2004), httpi/www.ejrc.cau.edu
/warren%20county%20rdb.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
131 Id.
132 Id. Starting in 2001, state and federal agencies spent $18 million to detoxify
or neutralize contaminated soil in the Warren County PCB landfill. Id.
1 COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, Toxic WASTES
AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND Socio-
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES wiTH HAzARDOuS WASTE SITES xiii
(1987), available at http'//www.ucc.orgabout-us/archives/pdfs/toxwrace87.pdf.
[Vol. 84:63
PROPERTY IS THEFT
found that while socio-economic status factored greatly in the
placement of commercial hazardous waste sites, race was the
most significant indicator of placement.' Partly in response to
the UCC report, the EPA created the Office on Environmental
Equity in 1991.11 The UCC report also prompted an executive
order in 1994, which mandated that federal agencies incorporate
environmental justice into all federal work and programs. 3 6
Thus, the environmental justice movement began with the public
recognition of two basic concerns: "first, the disproportionate
siting of environmental hazards or undesirable land uses in
minority-populated and low-income areas, and second, the
discrimination in the decision-making process that leads to such
disproportions."'37 In 2004, however, the EPA acknowledged that
the momentum had stalled when an EPA Inspector General's
report concluded that the agency had not developed a clear vision
or plan for including environmental justice in its daily
operations. 38 In 2006, the EPA Inspector General issued another
report that found that the agency had not conducted
environmental justice reviews of its programs. 139
Even though environmental justice activists have
expressed dissatisfaction with federal government action, the
environmental justice movement has redefined the popular
understanding of environment to mean "where we live, work,
play, worship, go to school, as well as the physical and natural
world."4 °  This new paradigm has brought attention to
environmental injustices in communities all across the United
States and has influenced environmental movements in other
parts of the world.' 4 '
Environmental justice and eminent domain cases share
unfortunate similarities. In both situations, the most likely
targets are communities with low-income residents and people of
134 See id.
135 See Bullard, supra note 126.
136 Id.
137 Kelly D. Lynn, Note, Seeking Environmental Justice for Cultural Minorities:
The South Lawrence Trafficway of Lawrence, Kansas, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
221, 225 (2003).
138 See Bullard, supra note 126.
139 See id.
140 Bullard, supra note 130.
141 The movement in the U.S. influenced global initiatives such as the 1992 Rio
Earth Summit and the World Summit on Sustainable Development ("WSSD') held
in Johannesburg in 2002. Id.
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color. As noted by Professor Bullard, "There is nothing inherent
about black communities that make them more suitable land
uses for dumps and other locally unwanted land uses," except
that these communities typically lack the political, legal, and
economic resources to fight the intrusion of toxic landfills-and
eminent domain. 4  Furthermore, local governments justify their
choice of location by promoting the anticipated significant
economic benefits to the area.
The civil rights and environmental justice social movements
illustrate the symbiotic nature of social movements and legal
reform. While social movements were key to galvanizing support
for reform, lasting change required legal action-as
demonstrated positively in the case of civil rights and more
slowly (in recent years) in the field of environmental justice."
Once legal reforms are adopted, legal scholars observe that
reforms are frequently difficult to sustain without the support of
a broader social movement. 143 That is largely because, even after
new legal rules restructure societal relations, changes in belief
systems come slowly.'"
B. Legal Reform for Social Justice Through Housing Reform
Effective legal reform, like politics, is the art of the possible. 145
As noted, social movements frequently need legal reforms to
enforce them. In the housing arena, legal reforms came in the
form of housing codes and the judicially mandated implied
warranty of habitability, both of which revolutionized housing
law in the 1960s and 1970s. Prior to the advent of the implied
warranty of habitability, landlords had no incentive to provide
decent, habitable housing for residential tenants and the doctrine
of caveat lessee controlled. 146 According to the doctrine, tenants
had no right to habitable housing, and the landlord had no
obligation to make even the most basic and necessary repairs
142 See id.
143 See Soohoo & Stolz, supra note 98, at 477.
144 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Building Bridges and Overcoming Barricades:
Exploring the Limits of Law as an Agent of Transformational Social Change, 47
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 423, 425 (1997).
145 Id. at 424.
14 See Mary Marsh Zulack, If You Prompt Them, They Will Rule: The Warranty
of Habitability Meets New Court Information Systems, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 425,
426 (2007).
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during the lease period.147 Of course, this did not present an
insurmountable problem for tenants who either had the money to
have repairs made (by the landlord or someone else) or those who
had the ability to make repairs themselves. It did, however,
present a problem for low-income tenants who had no market
power of their own and could not afford to hire someone to
attend to maintenance problems. Even if they could afford a
maintenance person, routine maintenance issues were the least
of their worries. As a result, low-income tenants in urban areas
often found themselves in substandard housing for which they
paid standard rent. Tenants had to withstand conditions such as
broken windows and locks, faulty wiring, broken heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning systems, inoperable or broken
plumbing, uncollected garbage, inoperable light fixtures, the
presence of vermin, falling plaster, and the presence and/or odor
of raw sewage. The greatest indignity was that the law protected
the landlord from liability for allowing such conditions to exist.
Finally, in the 1970s, public interest lawyers turned their
efforts to the courts on behalf of tenants. Courts began to re-
evaluate the legitimacy of using the doctrine of caveat lessee as a
default rule in residential leases. As has been the case
when confronted with other blatantly inequitable laws and
policies, judicial action resulted in two revolutionary reforms:
(1) the judicial adoption of the implied warranty of habitability,
through which landlords impliedly covenant to maintain
their residential premises for lease in a habitable and safe
condition throughout the duration of the lease, and (2) the
judicial adoption that a tenant's obligation to pay rent is
dependent on the landlord's compliance with the implied
warranty of habitability." Prompted by public interest concerns
about the human dignity of low-income tenants, courts have
undertaken the obligation to require that rental housing meet a
certain minimum standard of quality. 4 1
As noted by Professors Soohoo and Stolz, legal reform is
oftentimes more effective with the reinforcement of a broader
social movement. In a graphic residential housing story called
147 See id.
1" See id. at 426-27.
149 One way this obligation is met is through the warranty of habitability;
though this application of contract doctrine is viewed as a significant advance in
theory, some assert that courts have failed to order needed repairs. See id. at 427.
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"Rat Day,"150 Professor Gary Bellow illustrates how legal reform
and grassroots social movements can work together to achieve
powerful results for low-income residents. The story begins with
a man seeking help from a legal services office for an eviction
notice. The man explains to the lawyer that he lives in a large
run-down building owned by a wealthy downtown banker. The
building has many problems, such as poor plumbing and heat,
broken windows, and lots of rats. The man reports that the rats
get into the food and the bed and that a small baby down the hall
was bitten by a rat.
The story then presents the lawyer with two choices. The
first option being the traditional approach of litigating a
warranty of habitability claim, which may or may not result in
an improvement of the quality of housing stock. If the tenant
wins, he gets to stay in the rat-infested building, and if he loses,
he is evicted. The second choice is characterized as the
"lawyering for social change approach," which integrates social
and legal action. Choosing the latter approach, the lawyer used
the rat problem as an organizing tool and worked with the tenant
to organize a meeting with other tenants. Nearly all of the
people who attended complained about rats, and they agreed to
file a formal complaint with the city's housing office. After a city
housing inspection and a $100 citation to the landlord, the
tenants found the conditions unimproved and the city no longer
responsive to their complaints. The tenants met again and
agreed on a "Rat Day" plan. They would ask an exterminator to
service the building on a particular day on the promise that they
would pay for the extermination services if the landlord refused
to pay. The tenants found an exterminator willing to proceed
with that arrangement, and they further agreed that if their plan
worked, the exterminator would service their entire street for
several months.
On the chosen day, the tenants cleared out and vacated their
apartments, held a block party in front of their building, and
informed the press of the event. When the exterminator finished
at the end of the day, the organizing group distributed plastic
gloves to the tenants, who entered the building and brought out
150 "Rat Day" is fictional but is based on Professor Bellow's experiences with the
Community Action Agency of the United Planning Organization in Washington, D.C.
The following story is an abbreviated version of "Rat Day" as found in Cole's article
on environmental poverty law. Cole, supra note 121, at 679-82.
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the dead rats they found in their apartments. As the pile of rats
grew larger, crowds gathered, including the media. The
organizing group held a press conference and recounted their
experiences with their landlord and the city. They gave out the
landlord's home and office addresses and the phone numbers for
city officials. That night, television news stations reported the
event, as did the newspaper the next morning. Within a short
time, the landlord paid the exterminator's bill in full, and the
mayor's office pushed the city's housing office to increase its
enforcement work.
The "Rat Day" story illustrates the power of legal action
combined with a grassroots social movement. Even though the
tenant may still need legal assistance to defend the eviction
notice, broader issues were addressed through the social change
scenario.15 And, the lawyer likely improved the tenant's chances
of success in the legal arena by using "social justice lawyering"
because it enabled the judge to see a pattern of landlord abuses
in the same building.'52
The civil rights, environmental justice, and housing reform
initiatives all concerned the most vulnerable members of our
society. In these cases, the people adversely affected, along with
their advocates, found that they could fight exploitation by using
a mix of social movement organizing and legal reforms. This
two-pronged approach to social justice would be used again when
those living on the margins of our society found themselves
under assault by abuses of eminent domain.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CASE LAW IN THE
AREA OF EMINENT DOMAIN
A man's home may be his castle, but that does not keep the
Government from taking it.153
A. The Origins of Eminent Domain
Sovereigns have long enjoyed the privilege of appropriating
property from citizens, but the first recorded characterization of
that power came in 1625 when the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius
151 See id. at 682.
152 See id.
15 Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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described a sovereign's inherent power to take private property
for its own use without the consent of the owner of the property
as "eminent domain." 54 The concept formally found its way into
American jurisprudence by way of the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, which was ratified in 1791 and authorizes the
government to obtain private property.115 Unlike the
unconstrained authority described by Grotius, the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause qualifies governmental power by
stating, "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."'56 That constraint, however, post-
dates the United States beginnings of taking private property
from American Indians, which often occurred without the consent
of the owner and without compensation.
B. American Indians
Both federal and state governments have had a long and
inauspicious history of taking land from one owner and
transferring it to another for what the government deemed to be
a more beneficial use. Indigenous people have been the victims
of governmental takings for centuries, often without the benefit
of compensation. At one time in history, tribal governments or
individual tribal citizens owned "every single tract of land" in
certain areas of the United States. 57  A look at this history
demonstrates how western conceptions of property rights, free
markets, economics, and utilitarianism have devastated some
cultures.58  Thus, any discussion about the disposition of
property in the United States must consider American Indian
title,'59 as it "is the original link in almost all land titles in the
United States."160
1'4 Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain's Political
Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 245 (2006).
155 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16 Id. The Supreme Court later extended this prohibition to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 41 (1897).
157 See Leeds, supra note 2, at 59.
15' See Adams, supra note 47, at 114.
159 American Indians did not alone endure the impact of the "technologically
advanced Europeans who came to new foreign lands equipped with the most
effective of weapons-legal doctrines that would justify the taking of native lands as
well as institutionalize political, cultural, economic, and spiritual hegemony." Seth
Gordon, Indigenous Rights in Modern International Law from a Critical Third
World Perspective, 31 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 401, 402 (2007). The peoples of Africa and
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Many discussions of the dispossession of tribal land start
with the well-known case of Johnson v. M'Intosh,"' in which the
United States Supreme Court established the "doctrine of
discovery" as the law of the American state and federal
governments. 62 The doctrine of discovery declared that, in the
pursuit of the discovery of "new" lands, European nations, and
later American governments, gained real property rights to land
already owned and occupied by American Indians. 63 The theory
originated with Pope Innocent IV in the thirteenth century, when
he sanctioned "the taking of non-Christian, or infidel, lands by
Christian soldiers during the crusades." 64 When European
nations began exploring the New World, they adopted the
papacy's earlier commentary as legal justification for claiming
occupied tribal lands.165
Certainly, Johnson represents the Supreme Court's actual
adoption of the doctrine of discovery; however, American colonial
governments and courts' familiarity with the doctrine began
when the English Crown used it to colonize America and to
obtain tribal lands. 66 Prior to Johnson, new American states
adopted constitutions that included the power of discovery and
preemption over tribal lands. 67 In addition, early state courts
upheld state sovereignty and jurisdiction over tribal lands
pursuant to Discovery-era legal theory,168 thereby concluding that
"states could grant a limited fee title in Indian lands without the
consent of the tribe, even while the tribe was still occupying and
using the land."'69 Thus, by the time Johnson came along, the
Supreme Court's holding, while historic, was long anticipated in
light of the new America's experience with discovery.
Asia also suffered under "the geo-political land grab that became known as
colonization." Id.
'60 Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law, 42
IDAHO L. REV. 1, 63 (2005).
161 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
162 See Miller, supra note 160, at 4.
' See id. at 5.
1 Gordon, supra note 159, at 415.
' See id. at 414-16.
'6 See Miller, supra note 160, at 21.
167 See id. at 33-37 (discussing the inclusion of Discovery principles in the
constitutions of New York, North Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, Virginia, and
Connecticut between 1776 and 1796).
166 Id. at 37-40.
1 Id. at 39.
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In Johnson, the Court considered whether tribes had the
power to transfer title of tribal lands to private individuals.
Answering with a resounding "no," Chief Justice Marshall opined
that the appropriate rule of law regarding the acquisition and
transfer of property was the doctrine of discovery and that the
doctrine allowed a discovering country to rely on the title given
by discovery, regardless of whether indigenous people occupied
the lands.17° Marshall then reasoned that the American states,
and then the United States, acceded to the "absolute title" in
tribal lands that the Crown had-subject only to the tribe's right
of occupancy. 171
While by no means novel with regard to principles applied to
the disposition of tribal land, the Johnson decision was
nevertheless of great consequence for several established
reasons. First, it put the imprimatur of the Supreme Court on
the doctrine of discovery as established American law. Next, it
has been noted that Johnson acknowledged that under the
doctrine, Indian tribes lost two essential rights, the first being
the right of free alienability:
that is, the right to sell their real property to whomever they
wished for whatever amount they could negotiate. In addition,
Indian tribes lost significant sovereign powers because of [the
Doctrine of] Discovery. They lost the political right to deal
commercially and diplomatically in the international arena with
any country other than their "discoverer."172
In the end, Johnson nearly eliminated the property interests
of all Indian tribes when it refused to apply established
principles of property ownership to the tribes. 73 "Rather than
recognizing that tribes, as the original owners of the lands, had
the power to grant fee simple title to an individual or another
sovereign, the Court simply reclassified the tribe's original
property interest" as merely an occupancy right, which the
federal government could extinguish. 74  Clearly, the Court's
action constituted a taking of property, even if no one called it
170 Id. at 65-67.
I Id. at 66.
172 Id. at 67-68.
173 See Leeds, supra note 2, at 61.
174 Id.
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eminent domain. Regrettably, stark parallels exist between the
dispossession of Indian lands and the current trend in eminent
domain law as it relates to blight and economic development
cases. 175
C. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and Social Justice
Must the government fulfill a social justice obligation when
it takes property and, if so, from where does that obligation
arise? Unfortunately, the answer to those questions cannot be
determined by looking to the intent of the drafters of the Fifth
Amendment. Little historical evidence exists regarding the
intent that gave rise to the drafting and adoption of the Takings
Clause. 7 6  While contemporary evidence suggests that the
drafters intended the Takings Clause to limit government
regulatory authority of private property, no contemporaneous
evidence suggests as much.'77 To add to the mystery, the
Takings Clause distinguishes itself as the singular Amendment
in the Bill of Rights that no state requested. 7 ' Some go so far as
to suggest that current use of eminent domain powers conflicts
with the framers' intent. 79
In addition, Supreme Court rulings have failed to clarify or
articulate any clear conceptual basis for the Takings Clause. 80
In fact, 1922 marked the first time that the Supreme Court
expressly stated that the Takings Clause acted to limit
government regulatory authority.'8 ' Subsequent cases also failed
to either illuminate the foundational basis of the Clause or give
any clear interpretation of it until 1960, when Justice Black
made a remarkable statement about the Takings Clause. In
Armstrong v. United States, Justice Black stated, "The Fifth
Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken
for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
175 See id. at 66-67.
176 Gaba, supra note 80, at 571; see also Boyce, supra note 23, at 248.
177 See Gaba, supra note 80, at 571.
178 Id. at 572.
179 See Leeds, supra note 2, at 54 (citing Nancy K. Kubasek, Time To Return to a
Higher Standard of Scrutiny in Defining Public Use, 27 RUTGERS L. REC. 3 (2003)
("arguing that framers' intent would not permit current state of takings law")).
180 See Gaba, supra note 80, at 574.
'a' Id. at 571, 573.
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public as a whole."182 The phrase "fairness and justice"l'3 may
provoke thoughts of Rawls's theory of "justice as fairness" and
such interpretation is inviting. One might imagine that the
societal unrest during the height of the civil rights movement
inspired Justice Black to consider the inequities resulting from
governmental takings. Or maybe Justice Black considered the
annihilation of entire neighborhoods during the urban renewal
programs of the 1950s, when the government used eminent
domain powers to remove African American homes in order to
build highways or to allow for private development. Those are
appealing explanations, especially given the author of the
statement about "fairness and justice."' But, even as the
phrase "justice and fairness" has been repeated in Supreme
Court opinions, evidence does not suggest that the Supreme
Court has intentionally insinuated the principle of justice into
takings jurisprudence. That said, however, given the language
used by the Court, no reason exists to exclude a social justice
obligation from government takings.
V. THE ROAD TO KELO
The development of the discourse of blight reflected an evolution
in the proper uses of eminent domain.... [T]he urban renewal
scheme was... novel, both in form and scope. It authorized the
transfer of land from one group of private owners to another
group that would use it for practically the same purposes, and it
envisioned the transfer of large amounts of real estate in an
effort to reshape the urban landscape. Urban renewal was a
major undertaking that required... an alteration of the
relationship between property owners and the state.185
182 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
18 While Justice Black said "fairness and justice," subsequent declarations by
Supreme Court justices have modified the phrase to "justice and fairness."
1'4 Early in his political career, Hugo Black was a member of the Ku Klux Klan.
See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND His CRITICS 84 (1988). Once
appointed to the Supreme Court, however, he was considered a member of the
liberal wing of the Court and in a number of cases voted to establish civil rights for
Blacks. See id. In Chambers v. Florida, Justice Black expressed his interpretation of
constitutional protections in this way: "Under our constitutional system, courts
stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might
otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are
non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement." 309 U.S. 227, 241
(1940).
1 Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 31 (2003).
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A. Urban Renewal, Blight, and Economic Development
With the genesis of urban renewal cases in state courts in
the 1930s, redevelopment advocates perfected the argument that
in order to save cities from further decline and complete crisis,
governments had to condemn property and give it to those who
would find more suitable uses. 186 While renewal advocates did
not always have uniform goals for redevelopment, they generally
agreed that urban renewal required an expansive vision of
eminent domain authority. 187
The idea of "public-private takings""s was not novel; in fact,
urban renewal proponents borrowed the concept from a
nineteenth century practice of taking private property for the
benefit of privately owned mining companies, electric and gas
projects, and general manufacturing concerns.18 9  When
challenged by landowners as an abuse of eminent domain
powers, state courts took differing views on whether such takings
met the public use requirement. Some courts interpreted public
use literally to mean that the public should have direct access to
the taken property. 190 Other courts formulated a more liberal
interpretation of public use, which included any use that
promoted the general welfare of the community.191 Though these
inconsistencies existed, many legal scholars believed that
relevant precedents limited the power of eminent domain to
situations where the general public received direct benefits. 192
Urban renewal, as envisioned by the elite group of advocates,
required this broader application of public use. 193
"To secure political and judicial approval for their efforts,
renewal advocates created a new language of urban decline: a
186 See generally N.Y. City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153, 270 N.Y. 333
(1936).
187 See Pritchett, supra note 185, at 3.
18 Defined as the governmental use of eminent domain power to take private
property and convey it to another private entity. See Charles E. Cohen, Eminent
Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic
Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POLY 491, 500 (2006).
189 Id. at 506.
190 Id. at 507.
'91 Id. at 506.
19 Pritchett, supra note 185, at 3.
'9 See id.
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discourse of blight. Blight, renewal proponents argued, was a
disease that threatened to turn healthy areas into slums."'94 As
defined by the Committee of Blighted Areas and Slums, blight
was "an area where, due either to the lack of a vitalizing factor or
tp the presence of a devitalizing factor, the life of the area has
been sapped."195 In reality, renewal advocates used the concept of
blight as a stratagem to redistribute property ownership for
purposes of urban revitalization. Local governments deemed
areas desired by real estate developers as "blighted," thus
justifying condemnation and transfer of the property to
developers for a more productive use.1 96
This one word-blight--changed the legal landscape of
eminent domain. Before urban renewal, industrialization
provided sufficient justification for expansive applications of the
public use doctrine. Most everyone viewed industrialization as a
good and necessary aspect of a developing nation. Blight,
however, was another matter. Since its emergence into the
American lexicon in the early nineteenth century, the term
"blight" has lacked precise meaning,197 even while it has
maintained a consistent association. Later, federal law delegated
the definition and determination of blighted areas to state
governments, who in turn granted redevelopment corporations
and local governments broad authority in identifying blighted
areas.
198
The massive migration of African Americans to northern
states between 1940 and 1950 had a significant impact on urban
demographics and on how blight was defined. In that decade,
1,500,000 Blacks migrated north in hopes of employment and
194 Id.
195 Noreen E. Johnson, Blight and Its Discontents: Awarding Attorney's Fees to
Property Owners in Redevelopment Actions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 741, 747 (2008). The
Committee of Blighted Areas and Slums was created by Herbert Hoover during his
tenure as Secretary of Commerce. See id.
19 See Pritchett, supra note 185, at 3.
197 See generally Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic
Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305 (2004).
"In most states, [blight] reflects the 'laundry list' of health and safety concerns that
often serves as the only statutory definition." Id. at 320. See also Pritchett, supra
note 185, at 16 ("The term [blight] was first used by the Chicago school of
sociology .... to describe plant diseases."). Thereafter, renewal proponents argued
that blight "was a disease that threatened to turn healthy areas into slums." Id. at 3.
Pritchett asserts that "[bilight was a facially neutral term infused with racial and
ethnic prejudice." Id. at 6.
198 Gordon, supra note 197, at 312.
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opportunity.'99 By 1940, ninety percent of Blacks who had left
the South lived in urban areas, with forty-seven percent living
in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland, and
Pittsburgh."' "By 1950, over 9,000,000 blacks lived in urban
areas, marking the first decade in American history that more
blacks lived in cities than in rural areas."20'
It was against this backdrop in the 1940s that states adopted
redevelopment acts, under which renewal advocates, politicians,
and institutional leaders pursued dual goals.20 2  One goal
involved the selection of properties with profit potential,
regardless of whether the properties were dilapidated; the other
goal involved the relocation of people of color. 203 "While race was
always central to definitions of blight, after the great migrations
of World War II, race played an increasingly important role in
city planning .... [Tihe expanding minority black and Latino
ghettos were the main concern of business leaders and urban
politicians."2 4 Remarkably, in New York City, as in many other
cities, redevelopment advocates gained approval to clear well-
maintained areas that even they admitted did not meet the
standard of blighted.20 5 Citing the thousands of dollars that they
had invested in their neighborhood, the African American
residents in one New York City community asserted, as did many
other minority urban dwellers, that they were the victims of
"Negro clearance."20 6 While the residents' complaints delayed the
project, it nevertheless went forward.
B. State and Federal Shaping of Eminent Domain Law
Berman v. Parker20 7 represented the culmination of a
decades-long methodical effort by urban renewal advocates to
reshape the contours of eminent domain jurisprudence.0 ' In
199 Janet Thompson Jackson, Can Free Enterprise Cure Urban Ills?: Lost
Opportunities for Business Development in Urban, Low-Income Communities
Through the New Markets Tax Credit Program, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 659, 669 (2007).
200 Id.
201 Id. (quoting RAYMOND N. D'ANGELO, THE AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT: READINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS 8 (2001)).
202 See Pritchett, supra note 185, at 31-32.
203 See id. at 32.
204 Id. at 33.
205 See, e.g., id. at 34; see also Jackson, supra note 199, at 670.
20 See Pritchett, supra note 185, at 34.
207 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
208 Pritchett, supra note 185, at 1-2.
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1952, the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency
("DCRLA") proposed a massive clearance project that lasted
twenty years and resulted in the dislocation of "over 20,000
impoverished black residents and replaced their homes with
office buildings, stores, and predominantly middle-income
housing. "209 During the process, the DCRLA condemned a
department store that was not blighted, but was located on land
needed for the accomplishment of DCRLA's plan.210  The
department store owner sued to enjoin the taking, but the judge
upheld the District of Columbia's redevelopment plan and
authorized the condemnation "to the extent that [it] is reasonably
necessary to the accomplishment of the asserted public
purpose."21' The court, however, questioned the stated public
purpose of the plan and viewed the DCRLA's authority as
granted by the Redevelopment Act as overly broad in that it
could amount to the ability to "seize and sell whole sections of the
city."212  In so concluding, the court upheld the law as
constitutional but restricted DCRLA's condemnation authority,
leading both parties to appeal to the Supreme Court.2 13
At the Supreme Court, where DCRLA ultimately prevailed,
the parties debated the meaning of blight and the legal and
policy considerations for urban renewal. Absent from the
arguments, however, was the broad social impact of the project:
the fact that it would dislocate thousands of poor Blacks and
restructure the racial landscape in Washington, D.C. 214  The
silence regarding the racial and social justice ramifications of the
project is stunning given the timing of the Berman decision-just
four months after the Court decided Brown v. Board of
Education.215 "Brown began an era in which the Court rewrote
much of the constitutional jurisprudence regarding individual
rights .... The urban renewal program that the Court approved
209 Id. at 41. The deplorable conditions of the Washington, D.C. neighborhood
were well documented. Almost two-thirds of the homes were "beyond repair," over
half did not have indoor plumbing, and most lacked central heating. See Brief for
Better Government Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 23, Kelo v.
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108).
210 Pritchett, supra note 185, at 41.
211 Id. at 42.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 43.
214 Id. at 44.
215 Id.
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allowed cities to redistribute their populations, increasing
residential segregation and thereby making the integration of
schools far more difficult."216 In fact, the DCRLA project resulted
in the development of nearly six thousand housing units, of
which only about three hundred of the former residents could
afford, thereby turning the formerly black neighborhood to
majority white.217
Berman is remarkable not only for its outcome, but also
because it completely restructured the condemnation terrain and
entrenched the social injustices associated with takings
jurisprudence. Takings that disproportionately impacted
communities of color occurred prior to Berman, but in the
years that followed, eminent domain was used to blatantly
uproot entire communities of color under the euphemism of
"neighborhood revitalization."21 That is disturbing on a number
of levels, which Mindy Fullilove eloquently explains in her book
Root Shock.2" 9 Fullilove contends that urban renewal caused root
shock-"the traumatic stress reaction to the destruction of all or
part of one's emotional ecosystem" 22 -when each resident
experienced the loss of the world around them. In addition, root
shock occurred on a larger scale to generations of African
Americans.221 Calling urban renewal the "butterfly in Beijing,"
Fullilove asserts that certain conditions among African
Americans, such as drug addiction and the high levels of black
male incarceration, are inextricably tied to the mass destruction
of neighborhoods.22 2 She notes that the situation many African
Americans find themselves in "cannot be understood without a
full and complete accounting of the social, economic, cultural,
political, and emotional losses that followed the bulldozing of
1,600 neighborhoods."223
Thus, the history of eminent domain has long been infused
with racial overtones. And, just as the facially neutral term
"blight" has come to signal racial inequities, evidence suggests
216 Id.
217 Id. at 46-47.
218 Id. at 47.
219 MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOcK: How TEARING UP CITY
NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (2004).
220 Id. at 11.
221 Id. at 20.
222 See id.
= Id.
20101
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
that eminent domain for economic development purposes also
impacts communities of color and poor communities at a
disproportionate rate. As reported to the U.S. House of
Representatives in 2005, ninety-five percent of California
properties targeted for economic redevelopment are Hispanic or
Asian-owned, even though racial or ethnic minorities own only
thirty percent of the businesses in that area.224 In New Jersey,
officials in Mt. Holly Township targeted for economic
development "a neighborhood in which the percentage of African
American residents, 44%, is twice that of the entire township."22 5
C. Kelo v. City of New London226-- Permission To Plunder
The town of New London, Connecticut, had experienced a
precipitous economic decline since the 1970s and desperately
needed an economic revival.227  To that end, state and local
officials began economic development planning, which eventually
resulted in Pfizer Inc. announcing plans to build a research
facility in the area.228 Although the city's redevelopment plans
did not initially involve the transfer of private land to Pfizer,
Pfizer's plans required more land than what was available and
discussions with landowners revealed that few would voluntarily
sell their homes. As a result, the town initiated condemnation
proceedings based on the municipality's eminent domain
authority.229 The town did not allege blight as a reason for the
condemnation, but rather proceeded on the basis of needing the
land for economic development.230  Litigation ensued, and the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the taking as a
valid public use of promoting economic development.23'
224 See Hilary 0. Shelton, Director, NAACP Wash. Bureau, Statement Before the
House Energy & Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and
Consumer Protection: Protecting Property Rights After Kelo 2 (Oct. 19, 2005)
(transcript available at http'//archives.energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/108/
Hearings/10192005hearingl637/Shelton.pdf).
225 Id.
26 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
22 See id. at 473.
221 See id.
I Id. at 475.
2 0 Id. at 483-84.
23 Id. at 488-89.
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Public reaction to Kelo was both swift and extraordinary.
Commentators decried the decision as one of the worst decisions
to come out of the Supreme Court, while scholars questioned the
constitutionality of the Court's decision to classify economic
development as a public benefit sufficient to satisfy the public
use requirement.232  The decision also registered with
mainstream America in a way that most court decisions do not.
The strong reaction from the general public indicated that the
public identified with the petitioners.233 It was as if the public
was saying, "If the government can... seize [the homes of people
in] this neighborhood, [then] nobody's home is safe."234
The curiosity of Kelo was that similar urban renewal
initiatives to spur economic development had occurred in many
blighted communities across the nation with no attendant uproar
from those outside the immediately affected communities. Why
then, was this situation different? It may be because the
neighborhood and residents did not match the typical description
of other communities that had been targeted for condemnation
due to blight. The targeted neighborhood in New London was
characterized as a "distressed municipality" based on its
economic condition and high unemployment rate but had not
been deemed blighted. In fact, it was an old whaling community
and former manufacturing center just off the picturesque
Thames River.235 Several families had lived in the neighborhood
for generations. 236 And, the residents also happened to be
primarily white.2 37  While white working and middle-class
communities had not been immune from economic development
232 See David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the
Poor After Kelo, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 365, 371 (2007). Prior to Kelo, a number of state
courts held that economic development constituted a permissible basis for
condemnations as a matter of both federal and state constitutional law. Infamously,
in 1981, the Michigan Supreme Court held in Poletown that the City of Detroit acted
constitutionally when it condemned a stable, nonblighted neighborhood so that
General Motors could build a new plant. See id. at 372. In 2004, however, the
Michigan Supreme Court qualified its earlier reasoning, holding that economic
development does not always constitute a public purpose that justifies
condemnation. See id.
I. See Leeds, supra note 2, at 58.
-1' See id.
235 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473.
m6 Id. at 475.
17 See Janice Nadler et al., Government Takings of Private Property: Kelo and
the Perfect Storm, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSEY 286,
305 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008).
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condemnations, the Kelo outcome ignited concerns that no
property was safe. Fears were realized when, hours after the
Kelo decision, cities across the United States began eminent
domain proceedings for the purpose of economic development.23
D. Kelo-Four Years Later
Just four years after the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
New London, Connecticut, the land surrounding the Pfizer
corporate headquarters lies unused and covered with weeds. The
hotel, stores, and condominiums envisioned as part of the
community revitalization project were never built. In the fall of
2009, Pfizer announced that it would be moving its corporate
headquarters from New London to the nearby town of Groton,
taking 1,400 jobs with it. 239 Notwithstanding, the City of New
London and the State of Connecticut are left having to hold up
their end of an agreement with Pfizer: paying eighty percent of
the property taxes through 2011.240 Pfizer's actions demonstrate
that the company's first priority was its own self-interest rather
than a purported public good. Meanwhile, many of the original
landowners, who fought to stay in their homes, have been
irrevocably displaced because of the changing priorities of
corporate interests.
Returning to New York City, the threat of displacement still
hovers over the residents of apartment building 602 in West
Harlem-though residents recently celebrated a significant
victory. A New York appellate court dealt Columbia University a
surprising blow in December of 2009 when it overturned a trial
court's decision in favor of allowing the city to take property for
For example, in Freeport, Texas, the city condemned several properties that
housed waterfront shrimp processing businesses in order to replace them with
marina development projects. See Thomas, supra note 25, at 47. The legal battle
wages on in Freeport, Texas after nearly six years of litigation. After the City of
Freeport applied for a permit to condemn property that housed a shrimp processing
plant, the private developer now believes that the property slated for condemnation
is not necessary for the redevelopment project. While the fate of the plant is still
unknown, both parties have agreed to discuss the possibility of settlement. See W.
Seafood Co. v. United States, 202 F. App'x 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2006).
29 See Patrick McGeehan, Pfizer To Leave City That Won Land-Use
Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 2009, http'//www.nytimes.com/2009/1l/13/nyregion/
13pfizer.html?_r=2.
240 See William Fulton, Eminent Domain Outrage in Connecticut, GOVERNING,
Jan. 2010, available at http'J/www.governing.com/column/eminent-domain-outrage-
connecticut.
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the benefit of the university.241 The appellate court deemed the
expansion proposal through the vehicle of eminent domain to be
illegal.242 While the West Harlem community remains intact for
now, the development company has appealed the decision to the
highest state court of New York.24
3
VI. RESPONSES TO KELO
We must resist. We must mount a campaign of resistance and
fight back because if we don't, we will not be here, our children
will not be here and we will not recognize this place. We have no
other alternative but to fight back and we must do it together.
And we must hear the voices of the people of color. You can't sit
back. You have to speak out, even if it's to utter one sentence.
Get up. Speak in your own language. Get up. Rise up .... 244
A. Social Movement Responses
Social movements can affect change. A social movement
prompted changes in civil rights laws and in people's attitudes
toward racial minorities. A social movement attracted attention
to environmental injustices within depressed communities of
color. As has been noted, social movements cannot always create
change alone, but such movements are important steps toward
social justice. In the case of blight removal and economic
development condemnations, a social movement is underway, in
large part spurred by the Kelo case. One newspaper reported,
"Susette Kelo lost her case-but started a movement to reform
the law of eminent domain."245  Communities all across the
country have organized to stop Kelo-like intrusions from
destroying their neighborhoods. Soon after the Kelo decision,
citizens used voter initiatives and referenda to get eminent
241 See Terry Pristin, Square Feet: Lesson on Limits on Eminent Domain at
Columbia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2010, http'//www.nytimes.com/2OlOOl2OIrealestate/
commercial/20eminent.html.
242 See id.
24' See id.
24 Nellie Bailey, Co-founder, Harlem Tenants Council, Speech Delivered at the
Scoping Hearing on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Columbia
Expansion Proposal (Nov. 15, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.
stopcolumbia.org/content/view/71166/).
24 See Bruce Ramsey, Susette Kelo Lost Her Case-But Started a Movement To
Reform the Law of Eminent Domain, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at A9.
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domain on the ballot and in many cases, voted overwhelmingly to
prohibit eminent domain for economic development.246 And, with
the support of national property rights groups such as the Castle
Coalition,247 grassroots organizations are springing up all over
the country to fight the invasion of eminent domain. In New
Rochelle, New York, activists organized a demonstration outside
the Swedish embassy to protest the city's plans to condemn
homes and businesses for the building of an IKEA store.248
Residents of Lakewood, Ohio held a "Blighted Block Party."249 In
Harlem, New York, the Harlem Tenants Council has waged a
very public and formidable battle against Columbia University.250
Certainly, these movements represent social justice in
action. But authentic social justice demands that all
communities receive protection from injustice, particularly those
communities where the most at risk in society reside. As
Professor Leeds queried, "Where was the outrage when American
Indian lands were taken to make way for new settlers, or when
inner-city apartment buildings were taken for office buildings
and parking garages?"251 This question is still relevant given
that a recent report found that of 184 areas that have been
approved for economic development condemnations, the residents
were, on average, poorer, less educated, and more likely to be
people of color.25 2
B. Legal Responses
In Kelo, the Court left open a very important door through
which many state legislative initiatives have emerged. The
Court said, "nothing in our opinion precludes any State from
placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings
246 See Nadler et al., supra note 237, at 302-03.
See generally Castle Coalition, About Us, http://castlecoalition.org/index.
php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=42&Itemid=138 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
' See Castle Coalition, Make Noise, http://www.castlecoaition.org/index.php?
option=comscontent&task=view&id=300&Itemid=117 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
249 Id.
250 See David Freedlander, Columbia OKd for West Harlem, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
Nov. 27, 2007, at A15; Timothy Williams, Hearing on Columbia Plan Elicits
Emotional Speeches, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2008, at B2.
251 Leeds, supra note 2, at 58.
252 See DICK M. CARPENTER II & JOHN K. ROSS, INST. FOR JUSTICE, VICTIMIZING
THE VULNERABLE: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE 6-7 (2007),
available at http'J/www.ij.org/images/castlecoalition/docsvictimizing-the.vulnerable
.pdf.
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power."25 3 To date, over forty states have passed some type
of eminent domain reform that limits the ability of
local governments to take private property for economic
development.5 4 Some of the legislation fails to define blight or
economic development, and thus, does little to place stricter
controls on those types of condemnations.255 Other legislation
has produced stronger reforms.
In one of the most aggressive reforms nationwide, Florida's
legislation severely limits both economic development and blight
condemnations by imposing a ten-year waiting period on local
governments before they can use eminent domain to transfer
land to another owner.256  In 2006, Florida voters placed
additional limitations on state action by approving a
constitutional amendment that requires a three-fifths majority in
both houses to make any exception to the waiting period. 5 7
South Dakota previously prohibited outright the acquisition of
private property via eminent domain "[flor transfer to any
private person, nongovernmental entity, or other public-private
business entity."258 South Dakota also gives the original owner
the right of first refusal to buy the property back at fair market
value if the condemned property is not used for the purpose it
was taken for after seven years. 9 More recently, the meaning
of "blighted" was further redefined in South Dakota to require
the individual property to be a danger to public health and
safety.26° In 2006, South Carolinians overwhelmingly voted for a
constitutional amendment that places greater restrictions on
designating a property as blighted and "specifically prohibits
25 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005).
254 See Castle Coalition, Eminent Domain Legislation Status Since Kelo, July 16,
2009, http://castlecoalition.org/images/castlecoalition/states-ed-legis-map-7-2009.pdf.
For a comprehensive list of recent state legislation concerning eminent domain, see
Castle Coalition, Enacted Legislation Since Kelo, http:/castlecoalition.org/index.php
?option=comcontent&task=view&id=510&Itemid=107 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
255 See Dana Berliner et al., The Condemnation Landscape Across the Country
Post-Kelo, SM006 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 433, 439 (2007)
(contending that seventeen states need to reformulate their definitions of "blight" so
as to "complete the job of protecting homes and businesses against eminent domain
abuse"); Dana, supra note 232, at 374-77.
256 FLA. STAT. § 73.013 (2009).
257 FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6; see also CASTLE COALITION, supra note 3.
258 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-7-22.1 (2009).
259 Id. at § 11-7-22.2.
260 Id. at § 11-9-10.
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municipalities from condemning private property for 'the
purpose or benefit of economic development, unless the
condemnation is for public use.' "261
The Governor of Georgia signed a similar bill into law,
and Georgia voters subsequently approved a constitutional
amendment that requires a vote of elected officials before
property can be condemned for the purpose of redevelopment.262
Soon after, Georgia also modified the state's eminent domain
laws by prohibiting a "blighted" designation for property based
on its esthetic condition.263 After two legislative commissions
on the use of eminent domain, New Hampshire passed a
constitutional amendment that says, "No part of a person's
property shall be taken by eminent domain and transferred,
directly or indirectly, to another person if the taking is for the
purpose of private development or other private use of the
property."264 In addition, to be considered blighted, the property
must be a menace to health and safety.265 Texas may be the next
state to incorporate strong property rights protections into its
Bill of Rights. In May 2009, the Texas House of Representatives
unanimously passed a constitutional amendment aimed at
reducing the effects of Kelo by defining public use as a use only
by the government, the condemning authority, or the general
public.266 In 2008, the Delaware legislature passed much stricter
reform laws than the eminent domain restraints established in
the Kelo decision. Those laws would have given protection to
small businesses, farms and houses of worship from eminent
domain, but the governor vetoed that legislation, and the
legislature failed to override the veto.2 67 The legislature revisited
the issue in 2009 and introduced another bill with similar
261 Berliner et al., supra note 255, at 449 (quoting S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13).
262 GA. CONST. art. IX, § II, para. VII; see also Berliner et al., supra note 255, at
441-42.
263 GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1 (2009).
264 N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XII-a (2006); see also Berliner et al., supra note 255, at
446 (noting two legislative commissions, which led to amendment).
2 See S. 287, 2005 Gen. Ct., 159th Sess. (N.H. 2006).
26 See Castle Coalition, Fate of True Eminent Domain Reform Now in Hands of
Texas Senate After House Passes Strong Constitutional Amendment 144-0, May 12,
2009, http'//www.castlecoalition.orgindex.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=
1271&Itemid=130.
21 See Castle Coalition, Special Interests Win, Property Owners Lose with
Delaware Governor's Veto of Eminent Domain Reform, June 28, 2008, http'J/castle
coalition.orglindex.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=732.
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language to the one in 2008. This time, the new governor signed
the bill into law. The new law limits eminent domain to a more
traditional meaning by allowing only uses such as roads and
police stations.268
Other states that have passed reforms, such as Maine
and Kentucky, have acted to bar or severely limit economic
development condemnations while continuing to permit blight
condemnations. 269  This limited victory may prove illusory in
that "[aill or virtually all condemnations designated as blight
condemnations could be characterized as economic development
condemnations, inasmuch as the end goal of blight removal is
economic redevelopment."27 ° Still, other states have done little or
nothing to curb eminent domain abuse. As of 2009, New York
had failed to pass eminent domain reform, but legislation is
currently being considered by the legislature that may result in
meaningful reform. New Jersey's current laws use vague and
subjective standards for determining when municipalities can
take private property for private development. Such broad
criteria led some to conclude that "most every New Jersey
property is subject to acquisition," and that "New Jersey is one of
the nation's worst eminent domain abusers."271' Notably, in 2007,
the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the state's
definition of "blighted" did not include property that was merely
"not fully productive" and thereby created some limitation within
which a municipality may apply a statute that allows for the
redevelopment of land in a "stagnant" condition.272 Further
change may be on the horizon as New Jersey currently considers
several reforms to its eminent domain law. One such reform
would place a twenty-four-month moratorium on any use of
eminent domain by the state as a commission examines the
state's use of eminent domain.273 Remarkably, the State of
Connecticut, home to the Kelo case, passed eminent domain
268 See S. 7, 145th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009).
269 See Dana, supra note 232, at 376; see also Berliner et al., supra note 255, at
443-44.
2'0 Dana, supra note 232, at 369.
271 Berliner et al., supra note 255, at 446. The New Jersey law defines blighted
areas as those "dilapidated," "obsolescent," and in "lack of proper utilization." S.
2823, 212th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2007).
272 See Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 449
(N.J. 2007).
273 S. 293, 214th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2010).
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reform for the first time in 2007, but that reform has been
criticized as doing little to change eminent domain practices in
the state. 4
And so, in the midst of various levels of reform, many poor
communities continue their struggle to exist. A national social
movement against eminent domain abuses began only after the
public witnessed a predominantly white community (New
London) being victimized and suddenly, more entitled segments
of society felt threatened. Legal reform has, in large part,
been slow to address the injustice of carte blanche blight
condemnations or to significantly limit economic development
condemnations. While some states have enacted model eminent
domain reform, other states have failed to address the issue
altogether. Furthermore, reform efforts have essentially ignored
the plight of displaced low-income residents who are left without
affordable housing in a neighborhood of their choosing. In
essence, "there has been no legal movement to help ensure that
[residents] ... are provided with better (or even as good)
substitute housing. There has been no debate regarding
measures that might ensure that the new blight-condemnation-
facilitated development includes a substantial number of housing
units for low-income households .... -275 Until such concerns
become part of the eminent domain dialogue, social justice will
not be achieved.
CONCLUSION
The power of eminent domain is not inherently bad. In
certain circumstances, government takings can advance the
welfare of a community and its residents. In some cases where a
clear broader public interest exists, eminent domain powers may
be legitimately used to obtain needed land. But even then,
people may not be "made whole" in a process in which they lose
their home and social connections which were the foundations of
their life.
There are circumstances under which the use of eminent
domain is inherently unjust. The first such circumstance is
the historical and current use of blight as a pretext for the
displacement of entire communities of color. This has been
274 See CASTLE COALITION, supra note 3.
275 Dana, supra note 232, at 378.
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evidenced by the thousands of African American and other
minority neighborhoods that have been eliminated for the
purpose of removing "blight." Areas receive the moniker of
"blighted" so that developers can claim the land for an ostensibly
"better" use and cities can increase their tax base. In so
doing, residents in communities targeted for blight removal are
sent the message that-unlike better off, nonminority
communities-their homes and neighborhoods are expendable.
Existing residents are not treated in a way that recognizes them
as valued citizens. In an environmental context, when local
officials calculatedly place hazardous waste sites in communities
of color, we call that environmental racism. In the realm of
property jurisprudence, the intentional targeting of communities
of color for "blight removal" constitutes eminent domain racism.
By giving state legislatures seemingly unlimited authority to
define when blight condemnations can occur, courts have failed
in their social obligation. Even as many states reform laws to
address eminent domain abuses, most states have failed to
define blight in a way that prevents the removal of entire
neighborhoods on the basis of the complexion of those living
there. This was true when federal and state governments
condemned entire communities of color for "urban renewal," and
it continues to be true when governments condemn minority
neighborhoods for present-day redevelopment. Such blight
removal condemnations violate the notion of justice in that they
result from arbitrary distinctions based on race and class, which
allow for unjust outcomes. Such an approach is in direct conflict
with Rawls's view of "justice as fairness," which is marked by the
"elimination of arbitrary distinctions and the establishment,
within the structure of practice, of a proper balance between
competing claims."276 In instances where neighborhoods are
threatened by blight condemnations, justice demands that the
interests of poorer and minority communities are protected.
Takings for economic development constitute another
circumstance of injustice in eminent domain. Just as the term
blight has come to signify racial injustice, economic development
condemnations also primarily impact poor communities and
communities of color. Justices O'Connor and Thomas warned
276 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS (1958), reprinted in JOHN RAWLS:
COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 49, at 48.
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that such takings would fall disproportionately on poor
communities who have the least resources and power. Certainly,
U.S. eminent domain history served as a reliable barometer for
their premonition. As noted, a 2007 report found that the
majority of areas recently approved for economic development
condemnations consisted of residents who were, on average,
poorer, less educated, and more likely to be people of color.277
And so, the pattern of injustice continues. This pattern
represents a betrayal of western religion's roots in which society
and institutions share the responsibility of protecting vulnerable
members of society and ensuring a just society. It also is
injustice under the veil of utilitarianism ("greatest good for the
greatest number") and a betrayal of our nation's sense of
fairness. Rather than a theory of utility, social justice demands
"justice as fairness," justice that would not allow individuals or
institutions to impose upon the poor and vulnerable in society the
prospects of displacement from home and community for the sake
of profiting others.
The abuses of blight and economic development
condemnations also run counter to the higher standard of cosmic
justice, which requires that the parties end up in the position
they would have held but for their cosmic misfortune. In an
eminent domain context, this would mean implementing policies
which would ensure that the residents of poorer and minority
communities would themselves reap the benefits of any "blight"
removal and economic development that occurs in their
neighborhood.
As it is, the present-day circumstances of injustice in
eminent domain bear disturbing resemblances to Discovery-era
takings of tribal land, which contradicts justice in any form.
As noted, indigenous people were the victims of government
takings long . before the Supreme Court established the
doctrine of discovery as American law. The Supreme Court's
acknowledgement of such, however, was of great consequence for
reasons that also apply to the Court's holding in Kelo. First, just
as Johnson v. M'Intosh put the imprimatur of the Supreme Court
on the doctrine of discovery, the Kelo decision gave the Court's
blessing on economic development takings, which enabled
dominant social groups and economic development interests to
277 See CARPENTER II & Ross, supra note 252, at 6-7.
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exploit disadvantaged communities nearly at will. Second, as
Johnson acknowledged the loss to Indian tribes of the right of
free alienability, Kelo has signified a similar loss for many
Americans, that is, "the right to sell their real property to
whomever they [wish] for whatever amount they [can]
negotiate."278 Such a legal environment seriously compromises
the fundamental property rights of people living in poorer
neighborhoods and communities of color.
Given these injustices, what is the way forward? A review of
the civil rights struggle, the environmental justice movement,
and housing reform demonstrate how social movements and legal
reform can be vehicles for social justice for poor neighborhoods
and communities of color. In the four years since the Kelo
decision, social movements have surfaced all over the country to
protest economic development condemnations. The fact,
however, that a national debate about eminent domain abuse
only erupted after the Court ruled in Kelo that a predominantly
white neighborhood (New London) could be taken for economic
development purposes raises the question of just how concerned
the movement is about poor neighborhoods and communities of
color, which have been exploited through eminent domain actions
for decades.
A second potential recourse for social justice is legal reform.
Since the passage of Kelo, a majority of states have enacted some
type of eminent domain reform that impacts the ability of local
governments to take private property for economic development.
In some cases, this represents a significant effort to reverse the
negative impact on poor people and communities of color, and it
is tempting to believe that these movements will bring justice to
all communities. The evidence, however, does not suggest as
much as these reforms do not substantially redefine how
jurisdictions may use blight. As a result, poor people and
communities of color still find themselves as easy targets for
unjust condemnations because of inadequate attention to these
communities and inadequate laws to protect them. Until
legislatures and courts act to ensure that some people alone do
not "bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole," the unjust legacy of Kelo will
continue.
27 See Miller, supra note 160, at 67-68.
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"Justice, if we only knew what it was," queried Socrates. As
it turns out, in the case of eminent domain law, we know what
justice should be: the equal ability of citizens, regardless of race,
income or any other distinction, to protect their home and
community from unwarranted condemnation.
